South Carolina Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 11

Summer 2000

Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special Needs
Doctrine to Prosecute Pregnant Drug Users: Ferguson v. City of
Charleston
Carmen Vaughn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Vaughn, Carmen (2000) "Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special Needs Doctrine to
Prosecute Pregnant Drug Users: Ferguson v. City of Charleston," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 51 : Iss.
4 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Vaughn: Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special Needs Doctrine

CIRCUMVENTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
VIA THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE TO

PROSECUTE PREGNANT DRUG USERS:

FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1989 the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) implemented
a policy, developed in conjunction with local law enforcement officials, that
mandates testing the urine of pregnant women suspected of cocaine use.' If the
drug test is positive, the policy requires the pregnant woman to either
successfully complete a drug treatment program or face jail time.2 InFerguson
v. City of Charlestonten women who were subjected to the urine drug tests
challenged the policy in federal court, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld the policy? Before and after the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, scholars attacked the drug-testing policy on the
grounds that (1)the policy discriminates against indigent black womenbecause
they are more likely to visit a state hospital rather than a private hospital and
because the policy only applies to cocaine use;4 (2) the policy threatens the
reproductive freedom of women;5 and (3) the policy actually jeopardizes the
health of fetuses exposed to cocaine because pregnant users will avoid seeking
prenatal care out of fear of prosecution.6
This Note argues that the drug-testing policy violates the Fourth
Amendment because it allows law enforcement officials to obtain maternity
patients' positive drug tests without a warrant. Warrantless urine testing of
pregnant women for cocaine use is a permissible search by state physicians and
hospital staff under the special needs doctrine to the Fourth Amendment.
Reporting the positive drug test results to law enforcement, however,
overreaches the scope of the special needs doctrine, and therefore violates the
Fourth Amendment because the special needs doctrine should not apply to

* This Note originally appeared in Book 3, Volume 51 of the SoutH CAROLINA LAW
REvEV.

1. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 474 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,68
U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Feb. 28,2000) (No. 99-936).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 473-74, 479.
4. Kimani Paul-Emile, The CharlestonPolicy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 325, 349 (1999).
5. Lynn M. Paltrow, PregnantDrug Users,FetalPersons,and the Threatto Roe v. Wade,
62 ALB. L. REv. 999, 1005 (1999).
6. Michelle D. Mills, Comment, FetalAbuseProsecutions: The Triumph ofReaction Over
Reason, 47 DEPAuL L. REv. 989, 1037 (1998).
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searches that result in criminal prosecution.7 Although the Supreme Court has
not clearly decided whether a special needs search can result in a criminal
prosecution, this Note argues that such a result violates the Fourth Amendment.
This Note also argues, in the alternative, that the Ferguson case can be
decided on the basis of a narrower principle than one barring all prosecutions
arising from special needs searches. Specifically, law enforcement's receipt of
the drug test results violated the Fourth Amendment in Ferguson because the
women tested were unaware that the search could lead to prosecution.
Furthermore, law enforcement's receipt of the test results also violated the
Fourth Amendment because physicians and healthcare workers collaborated
with law enforcement to design a policy that requires medical professionals to
disclose confidential information to law enforcement.
Part II of this Note describes the facts and the procedural history of
Ferguson and explains the Fourth Amendment's basic requirements and the
elements of the special needs doctrine. Part II also discusses the Fourth
Circuit's application of the special needs doctrine to the conduct of MUSC's
physicians and staff in testing the maternity patients' urine samples. Part III
argues that criminal prosecutions should not follow special needs searches.
Alternatively, Part III argues that if courts allow criminal prosecutions to result
from special needs searches, then those women tested should have notice that
the special needs search might lead to prosecution. Moreover, prosecutions
should not occur from special needs searches if a party to a confidential legal
relationship, such as the physician-patient relationship, suffers a heightened
intrusion due to law enforcement's involvement in the relationship.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
Inresponse to concerns about cocaine use amongpregnant women, MUSC
instituted a policy providing for the urine drug-testing ofpregnant women that
exhibited symptoms of cocaine use.8 The policy also required that the staff
report any positive drug test results to law enforcement officials. 9 The policy
originated when a case manager in the obstetrics department at MUSC spoke
with MUSC's general counsel about the possibility of creating a policy that
would focus on drug use by pregnant women and the potential health risks to
the user's children." The general counsel contacted the Ninth Circuit Solicitor,
and a task force committee was formed that included the case manager, the
Solicitor, the Chief of the City of Charleston Police Department (CCPD), and

7. See discussion infra Part III.A.
8. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
9. Id.

10. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/11
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prenatal-care doctors at MUSC." The Solicitor told the committee that because
a viable fetus was considered a "person" under South Carolina state law,' 2 a
woman who used cocaine after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy was guilty
of distributing a controlled substance to a minor.'3
MUSC implemented the policy in the fall of 1989.'" Under the policy,
MUSC tested a maternity patient when any of the following signs of cocaine
use were present:
(1) separation of the placenta from the uterine wall; (2)
intrauterine fetal death; (3) no prenatal care; (4) late prenatal
care (beginning after 24 weeks); (5) incomplete prenatal care
(fewer than five visits); (6) preterm labor without an obvious
cause; (7) a history of cocaine use; (8) unexplained birth
defects; or (9) intrauterine growth retardation without an
obvious cause.' 5
Officials did not obtain warrants before the urine tests were taken, nor were any
obtained before the hospital staff turned the positive tests results over to the
police.' 6
When the policy was first implemented, a patient's positive drug test result
was reported to the police or to the solicitor's office.'7 The patient was then
arrested for distributing cocaine to a minor.'" In 1990 the policy was modified
so that a patient that tested positive had a choice of either being arrested or
receiving drug treatment.' 9 If the patient elected to receive drug treatment, the
positive test results were not reported to the police unless the patient failed to
complete treatment requirements or tested positive a second time.2" A patient
that was arrested could also complete a drug-treatment program to avoid
prosecution. 21
Ten women, all of whom were tested under the policy and nine of whom
were arrested,' brought an action in the district court in South Carolina

11. Id.
12. Id. (citing State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444,447,319 S.E.2d 703,704 (1984) (holding that
a viable fetus was a person within the meaning of South Carolina criminal law)).
13. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (West Supp. 1999) (making the distribution of
cocaine to a minor by a person the age of eighteen or over a felony); Whitner v. State, 328 S.C.
1,4-15,19,492 S.E.2d 777,778-84, 786 (1997) (upholding the conviction ofawomanwho used
cocaine while pregnant with a viable fetus).
14. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
15.Id.
16. Id. at 486; Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 364.
17. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.Id. at 474-75.
22. Id. at 484.
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claiming that the policy violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures and infringed upon their right of privacy?'
The women also claimed that the policy was racially discriminatory and that
MUSC staff committed the state-law tort of abuse of process.24 After hearing
evidence the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the
defendants on the abuse-of-process andprivacy claims.' The district court also
found for the defendants on the race-discrimination claims.26 The jury returned
Fourth Amendment claim.27 The women
a verdict for the defendants on the 28
Circuit.
then appealed to the Fourth
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court on all claims. 29 At trial the
district court judge ruled that the urine tests were "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." The court then sent to the jury the issue
of whether the patients had consented to the searches, and the jury found that
the patients had consented.3' On appeal the plaintiffs asserted that the judge
should not have sent the issue of consent to the jury and, alternatively, asserted
that the verdict was not supported by the evidence.32 The Fourth Circuit did not
address those assertions. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of
defendants on the Fourth Amendment claim because the warrantless searches
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as "special needs searches. 33
B. The SpecialNeedsException to theFourthAmendment's Warrantand
ProbableCause Requirement
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in theirpersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" and that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause..."'
Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies when the government intrudes into
privacy through the use of searches or seizures and guarantees that these
searches or seizures must be reasonable.3 5 Reasonableness is the "ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search...., 3 6

23. Id. at 475.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 475-76.
27. Id. at 475.
28. Id. at 476.
29. Id. at 474. Due to the focus of this Note, only the issues surrounding the Fourth
Amendment claim are discussed.
30. Id. at 476.
31. Id.
32.Id.
33.Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
35. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
36. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
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4

Vaughn: Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special Needs Doctrine

2000

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Generally, the reasonableness requirement prevents the government from
conducting searches or seizures without individualized suspicion.37 Whether a
particular search is reasonable is "judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."3 In most criminal cases, the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment controls this balance.39 Thus, unless a search fits into an
exception to the Warrant Clause, 4° a search or seizure in a criminal case "is not
reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to ajudicial warrant issued upon
probable cause."' Nonetheless, certain exceptional situations exist in which
"neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of
individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness
....
42 The special needs exception falls under those circumstances in which
not even individualized suspicion is required.
The special needs exception applies when a governmental intrusion "serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,"43
and when those special governmental needs would make it impracticable for
governmental officials to obtain a warrant or even comply with the probable
cause requirement." A balancing test, weighing privacy interests against the
governmental need, is applied to determine if the governmental need would
make the warrant requirement, probable cause, or any other level of
individualized suspicion impracticable. 45 Three primary factors are taken into
account under the special needs balancing test: (1) the importance of the
governmental need; (2) the effectiveness of the governmental intrusion in
furthering the governmental need; and (3) the degree of intrusion upon the
individual, from both an objective and subjective viewpoint." The
governmental need must be an interest "important enough to justify the
particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy. ' 47 The alleged

37. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
38. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
39. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
40. See generally 2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 802-09 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing various exceptions). Some
exceptions in criminal cases in which a warrant does not have to be obtained include searches
incident to an arrest, searches after an individual is taken into custody, consent searches, open
field searches that allow police to search items in open public view, stop and frisk searches of
suspicious individuals, and searches conducted within hot pursuit and other exigent
circumstances to prevent the destruction of evidence. Id.
41. Skinner, 489 U.S, at 619.
42. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
43. Id.
44. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
45. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blacknun, J., concurring).
46. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir. 1999).
47. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
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governmental interest must also address a "concrete danger" and not just a
The effectiveness
problem with a slight probability of actually occurring.'
prong of the special needs balancing test focuses on the extent that the
governmental search promotes the governmental need."' Courts only need to
consider whether the governmental search was an effective one, not whether
the government officials chose the mostreasonable alternative technique for the
search." Finally, the degree ofintrusion into the privacy of the individual must
be minimal." The intrusion can be measured both objectively and
subjectively, 2 although the Fourth Amendment will not protect "subjective
expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise 'illegitimate."'5 3 An
intrusion is measured objectively by the duration of the seizure and the
intensity of the search, while an intrusion is measured subjectively by looking
at whether the search method increases or decreases the level of fear and
surprise felt by the individual searched.54
C. The Fourth Circuit'sApplication of the Special Needs Doctrine in
Ferguson
The Fourth Circuit should have held that only the search conducted by
state hospital workers of the patients' urine samples for cocaine was
permissible under the special needs doctrine.5 5 The dissemination of the
positive test results to law enforcement by the hospital workers, which then led
to the arrests of maternity patients, violated the Fourth Amendment. Before
analyzing why the special needs doctrine was misapplied by permitting law
enforcement to obtain the positive test results without a warrant, this section
will explain the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in applying the special needs
doctrine to the conduct of the medical staff at MUSC.
Before applying the special needs doctrine, the Fourth Circuit noted that
both parties to the litigation conceded that MUSC is a state hospital, and thus
the MUSC employees are governmental actors.5 6 In its opinion the court also
accepted the district court's factual finding that the MUSC staff conducted the
urine drug tests for medical purposes and not for the purpose of aiding law

48. Chandler v.Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997).
49. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
50. Id. at 453-54.
51. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
52. Id.

53. TL.O.'469 U.S. at 338.
54. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (referring to the test for the
degree of subjective intrusion).
55. The Fourth Circuit based its analysis on the assumption that testing the urine of
maternity patients constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477
n.6.
56. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477. The Fourth Amendment only provides protection against
governmental action. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 33-34 (5th ed. 1996).
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enforcement. 7 In light of this finding, the question becomes whether the
medical purpose underlying the.policy was a "special need."
The Fourth Circuit correctly concluded that the governmental interest of
MUSC personnel could justify a special needs search. 5 The staff at MUSC
noticed an increase in the number ofpregnant women using cocaine.59 The staff
was also worried about the potential harm to the users' children because
cocaine use by pregnant women can cause "low birth weight, premature labor,
birth defects, and neurobehavioral problems."6 ° Further, cocaine can damage
developing organs in a fetus, and the most harmful damage usually occurs to
the developing brain.6' The court also identified the cost of caring for cocaineexposed infants as another reason to justify the state's important interest in
conducting urine drug tests.6' At trial one defense expert testified that he had
previously estimated the costs of maternal cocaine use might exceed three
billion dollars annually over the next ten years.63 For the above reasons,
sufficient evidence existed for the court to conclude that MUSC had an
important governmental interest in conducting urine drug tests."
The governmental interest in Ferguson is similar in strength to other
interests that the Supreme Court has found sufficient to support other
suspicionless drug-testing programs.65 For example, in Vernonia School
District47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court held that the school district had an
important interest in drug-testing student athletes because of an immediate
crisis of increased drug use among student athletes and an associated increase

57. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477.
58. Id. at 478.
59. Id. at 477-78.
60. Id. at 478.
61. Carol Gosain, Note, Protective Custodyfor Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of
MaternalDrugUse? Casenoteon Wisconsin Ex Rel. Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 GEO.MAsoNL. REv.
799, 801-02 (1997). Some researchers now argue that the effects ofmatemal cocaine use are not
as great as previously thought:
'[D]ozens of studies now indicate that (1) the pharmacological impact of
cocaine has been greatly exaggerated, (2) other factors are responsible for
many of the ills previously associated with cocaine use, and (3) political
and legal responses have done more to exacerbate than alleviate the
situation of poor and/or drug-using pregnant women and their stigmatized
children.'
Paltrow, supra note 5,at 1018 (quoting The Lindesmith Center's and Women's Law Project's
Amicus Curiae Brief, Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1,492 S.E.2d 777 (1997), cert.denied,523 U.S.
1145 (1998), reprintedin Daniel N. Abrahamson et al., Amicus CuriaeBrief: Cornelia Whitner
v. The State of South Carolina, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 139 (1998)). However, even if
maternal cocaine use does not cause as many complications as previously thought, the
undisputed effects are sufficiently harmful to justify state intrusion.
62. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478.
63.Id.
64. Id.
65. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,661-63 (1995); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,668 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
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in discipline problems among the whole student body." The Court also
considered the safety risks involved with student athletes' drug use, such as
increased sports injuries.67 In Skinner v. Railway LaborExecutives'Ass 'n, the
Court also addressed safety concerns in finding an important governmental
interest."' The Court upheld random drug-testing of railway engineers in light
of the dangerous risks of a railway accident caused by an employee using
drugs. 69 In addition to safety concerns, the Court has also found an important
government interest when drug-testing is used to ensure that employees in
certain high-risk and safety-sensitive jobs are not themselves drug users.70
Thus, inNationalTreasuryEmployees Union v. Von Raab,the government had
an important interest in ensuring that United States Customs Service employees
remained drug-free because their positions involve the interdiction of drugs and
firearms into the Unites States, and because these employees are often subject
to bribes.71
In comparison to the above cases, the Supreme Court in Chandler v.
Miller72 rejected the alleged important governmental interest in drug-testing
candidates for public office. In Chandler,no evidence was offered to show that
animmediate drugproblem existed amongpublic officials or that suspicionless
drug-testing was necessary to prevent that problem from arising.73 The Court
stated that "public safety is not genuinely injeopardy" by possible drug use of
candidates for public office.74
The governmental interest in Ferguson closely resembles the interests in
Vernonia,Skinner, and Von Raab rather than the alleged interest in Chandler.
Evidence in Ferguson demonstrated an immediate concern of fetal drug use
because drug use was actually occurring and, indeed, was increasing. Evidence
also demonstrated that drug use threatened the safety of fetuses.7 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit was justified in finding that the governmental interest in
Fergusonwas a special need.
The Supreme Court has also stated that public school teachers can conduct
certain searches without a warrant because "requiring a teacher to obtain a
warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or
of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift
and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."7 6 Similarly, with

66. 515 U.S. at 662-63.
67. Id. at 662.
68.489 U.S. at 628.
69. Id. at 628, 634.
70. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670-71 (1989).
71. Id. at 669-71.
72. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
73. Id. at 318-19.
74. Id. at 323.
75. 186 F.3d 469,477-78 (4th Cir. 1999).
76. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
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physicians a warrant requirement would unduly interfere with providing
patients immediate healthcare, especially in circumstances where the health of
a fetus may be at stake. Therefore, physicians need to have the ability to
conduct warrantless searches to further their important interest in preventing
prenatal drug abuse.
The Fergusoncourt also found that the testing of maternity patients' urine
for the presence ofcocaine was an effective method of identifying and treating
maternal cocaine use.77 The court remarked that "prenatal testing was the only
effective means available to accomplish the primary policy goal of persuading
women to stop using cocaine during their pregnancies in order to reduce health
effects on children exposed to cocaine in utero." T Judge Blake in his dissent

argued that the policy implemented by MUSC failed the effectiveness prong
of the special needs balancing test.79 He argued that because seven of the
plaintiffs were arrested after giving birth, then any harmful effects of their
cocaine use would have already occurred."0 In fact, some women were even
tested during delivery or after they had given birth."' However, the majority
stated that the focus of the effectiveness test is not on whether the arrests
advance the government's interest, but on whether the urine tests advance the
interest.s2 Even though the effectiveness of the policy remains debatable, the
Fourth Circuit's finding is comparable to other special needs cases in which
drug-testing was found to be effective.8 3
Finally, the court found that testing maternity patients' urine was
minimally intrusive." The court noted that, while normally privacy interests
are not minimal during the collection and testing of urine,85 the testing of the
patients' urine by MUSC staff was conducted in the normal course of a routine
medical examination.86 Because these exams were routine, the duration and
intensity of the search were objectively minimal.8 7 The court also found that the

77. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 488 (Blake, J., dissenting).
80.Id.
81. Id. at 485. At least three plaintiffs were tested during or after the delivery of their
children. Id.
82. Id. at 478 n.8.
83. Cf.Vemonia Soh. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,663 (1995) (contending that urine
drug-testing is effective because it is "self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the'role
model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively addressed
by making sure that athletes do not use drugs"); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1989) (finding random drug testing of railway employees effective
because the tests will serve as a deterrent against drug use for employees that know they can be
subject to a drug test at anytime).
84. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
85. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 (stating that tests which require employees to "perform an
excretory function" are traditionally not minimal, although procedures can be used to reduce the
intrusiveness of collecting urine samples).
86. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
87.Id.
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tests were subjectively minimal because the urine drug tests were performed
only when one of the signs of cocaine use was present.8 Because the doctors
had no discretion in deciding whom to test, the process was regular and neutral,
thus minimizing the fear and surprise factor.89 When the court balanced the
importance of the governmental interest, the effectiveness of the urine drug
tests, and the minimal amount of intrusion suffered by the patients, the court
correctly concluded that the searches conducted by MUSC staff were
reasonable under the special needs doctrine and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.90
1H. ANALYSIS
A. Special Needs SearchesShould Not Result in CriminalProsecution
A fundamental principle of the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement is that it applies to governmental searches
that advance governmental needs beyond the normal needs of law
enforcement.9' The primary problem with the policy implemented by MUSC
is that it is hardly clear how the arrest and prosecution of pregnant cocaine
users serves a need other than normal law enforcement needs.
The special needs doctrine was created to apply to law enforcement needs
other than crime-detection concerns.92 In his dissent in New Jersey v. T.L. 0., 93
Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he undifferentiated governmental interest in law
enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement."' Further, some governmental need beyond a "need merely to
apprehend lawbreakers" is necessary to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement." Therefore, probable cause and a warrant are still required for
most criminal searches, while lesser standards may be used for noncriminal
searches, such as administrative searches. 96
In Ferguson the majority and the dissent disagreed over whether the
MUSC policy constituted a criminal or noncriminal search.97 While the
majority did not believe that any part of the implemented policy was meant to

88. Id.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
92. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
93.469 U.S. 325 (1985).
94. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
95. Id.
96. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68 (1989).
97. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 484 (4th Cir. 1999) (Blake, J.,
dissenting).
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MUSC's drug-testing policy appears to have both a medical purpose and a
punitive purpose. This contention becomes an important factor when analyzing
the scope of the search at MUSC because searches under a warrant exception
must be limited to the circumstances that trigger the exception.99 Therefore, in
Ferguson the medical concerns for cocaine-exposed fetuses triggered the
special needs exception."°° The special needs exception to the warrant
requirement can thus be used only to address the medical concerns. MUSC
physicians and staff arejustified in conducting urine tests for medical purposes
because they remain within the bounds of the circumstances that triggered the
special needs exception. However, law enforcement's warrantless receipt of the
positive drug tests oversteps the bounds of the special needs search because a
prosecutorial motive is not a circumstance that can trigger the special needs
exception.

98. See id. at 475 n.3. Judge Blake believed that the record of the case showed "an initial
and continuing focus of the policy was on the arrest and prosecution of drug-abusing mothers,
either before or after they had given birth to the children presumably affected by the cocaine
use." Id. at 484. Judge Blake cited aletter written by MUSC's general counsel to the Charleston
City Solicitor, which stated:
I read with great interest in Saturday's newspaper accounts of
our good friend, the Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit,
prosecuting mothers who gave birth to children who tested
positive for drugs .... Please advise us if your office is
anticipating future criminal action and what if anything our
Medical Center needs to do to assist you in this matter.
Id.
Judge Blake also relied on a letter by the general counsel to a senior assistant attorney in
which the general counsel stated that MUSC's drug testing policy was developed from the
suggestions of law enforcement. Id. A statement by Condon also suggested that the policy was
driven by law enforcement goals: "We all agreed on one principle: We needed a program that
used not only a carrot, but a real and very firm stick." Dorthy E. Roberts, UnshacklingBlack

Motherhood,95 MICH. L. Rav. 938, 942 (1997) (quoting former Ninth Circuit Solicitor Charles
Condon).
99. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). In Tyler the fire department responded to
a fire at a furniture store. Id. at 501. The fire chief called in police detectives to investigate the
possibility of arson. Id. at 502. The police detectives did not obtain warrants or consent to
conduct the search in which the detectives seized evidence. Id. The police left and returned to
the scene four hours later and also returned to the scene the next morning to conduct warrantless
searches. Id. Approximately three weeks after the fire, the police returned again to seize evidence
without a search warrant. Id. at 503. The Court held that the warrantless searches conducted on
the same day or the day after the fire did not violate the Fourth Amendment because "[a] burning
building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry." Id.
at 509. The Court found that this exigency included the right of the police officers to investigate
for arson and seize evidence in plain view. Id. at 510. However, the Court held that the
warrantless search, conducted three weeks after the fire, violated the Fourth Amendmentbecause
the initial exigency had ended. Id. at 511. The search was too far removed from the initial
exigency, and therefore a warrant was required. Id.
100. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 477-78.
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The Court has not been clear on whether a search permissible under the
special needs doctrine can then lead to criminal prosecution."0 ' In both Von
Raab and Vernonia, the Court seemed to justify drug tests under the special
needs exceptionpartly because the results of the tests were not used in criminal
prosecutions. 2 In Von Raab the Court upheld the suspicionless urine drugtesting of United States Customs employees who were applying for positions
that prohibited the use of illegal drugs or that required the employee to carry
a firearm.0 3 The Court stated that it was clear that "the Customs Service's
drug-testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement. Test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the
employee without the employee's consent.""' Thus, the Von Raab Court cited
the nondissemination of test results to law enforcement as indicating that the
testing program was designed to serve a special need. 0 5 In Vernonia the Court
used similar language, although for a different rationale, stating that the student
athletes who are subject to random drug tests suffer a minimal level of privacy
intrusion because "the results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class
of school personnel who have a need to know; and they are not turned over to
law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function."'0 6
In Vernonia, however, the Court used that factor as a means of judging the
level of intrusiveness of the search.0 7 The Von Raab opinion offers stronger
support for the proposition that a special needs search should not lead to
criminal prosecution because prosecution in itself is not a special need. The
Vernonia opinion would suggest that a criminal prosecution would not
necessarily prevent a warrantless search under the special needs exception,
especially if the governmental interest greatly outweighed the intrusiveness
aspect of the dissemination of the information to law enforcement.
However, the Fourth Circuit did not even consider the intrusiveness aspect
of law enforcement's receipt of the maternity patients' positive drug test results
in the balancing test.0 8 If this factor had been considered, the balancing test
would likely have shifted against the conclusion that law enforcement could
obtain the positive test results without warrants because subsequent arrests and
prosecutions usually become a matter of public record. Because law
enforcement's warrantless receipt of information that should have been
obtained pursuant to a warrant is highly intrusive, the governmental interest
will likely be outweighed by the intrusiveness aspect of the search. Thus, the

101. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz,496 U.S. 444,447 (1990); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870, 873 (1987).
102. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
103. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
104. Id. at 666.
105. Id.
106. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
107. Id.
108. See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/11

12

Vaughn: Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special Needs Doctrine
2000
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

criminal prosecution consequence of the search will prevent the special needs
doctrine not to apply in these cases."es
While the Supreme Court has indicated that a search is permissible under
the special needs doctrine because the search will not lead to a criminal
prosecution, the Court has upheld some criminal prosecutions following a
special needs search." 0 In Griffin v. Wisconsin the Court upheld the warrantless
search of a probationer's home by probation officers under the special needs
exception even though the probationer was later convicted for possessing a
firearm discovered during the search."' In Michigan Dep'tof State Police v.
Sitz, the Court also upheld, underthe special needs doctrine, the use ofhighway
sobriety checkpoints that could result in the arrests of intoxicated drivers." 2
However, courts should not misapply the special needs doctrine in order to
uphold criminal prosecutions that result from warrantless searches lacking
probable cause. When courts allow this type of usurpation of the special needs
doctrine, they are jeopardizing the protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.
A comparison of the special needs doctrine with the doctrine of
administrative searches is instructive. The Supreme Court has said that
administrative searches should not be used as a pretext for a criminal
prosecution."' Usually, in administrative searches officials other than police
conduct the searches. 4 These types of searches are usually for housing
inspections, welfare visitations, or inspections searching for violations of
government regulations, such as environmental or safety regulations.1 The
Supreme Court has allowed warrantless administrative searches based upon a
balancing of the governmental interest against an individual's privacy
interest."' In one of the first administrative search cases, Frankv. Maryland,
the Court upheld a warrantless housing inspection search." 7 In justifying the
warrantless search, the Court noted that the inspector was only looking for
109. Judge Blake, in his dissent, also found that the privacy intrusion upon the maternity
patients was not minimal because the positive drug test results were reported to "law
enforcement officials with no medical reason for receiving the information." Id. at 488 (Blake,
J., dissenting).
110. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987); Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990).
111.483 U.S. at 870, 880.
112.496 U.S. at455 (1990). In Part II.B, Fergusonwill be distinguished from Griffin and
Sitz on the basis of whether notice is available to the individual that a special needs search may
result in a criminal prosecution.
113. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,294 (1984); Frank v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 360,
367 (1959), overruled in part by Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
114. See O'BRIEN, supra note 40, at 858. In New York v. Burger, plainclothes police
officers conducted an administrative search of an automobile junkyard. 482 U.S. 691, 693
(1987).
115. O'BRIEN, supra note 40, at 858.
116. Id.
117. 359 U.S. at 373.
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housing code violations; the inspector was not looking for evidence to be used
in a criminal prosecution."' The Court also remarked that an "[i]nspection
without a warrant, as an adjunct to a regulatory scheme for the general welfare
of the community and not as a means of enforcing the criminal law, has
antecedents deep in our history.""' 9 This statement suggests that if the
inspection had been used as a means of also enforcing the criminal law, then
a warrant would have been required.
In Michigan v. Clifford 20 the Supreme Court also stated that an
administrative search should not be the basis of a criminal prosecution unless
a warrant was obtained by a showing of probable cause to a neutral judicial
officer.12 ' In Clifford a couple was arrested and charged with arson in
connection with a fire at their home." The couple was out of town during the
fire,"z and fire investigators searched the area of the house that the fire
destroyed.'24 When they discovered incriminating evidence of arson,
investigators then searched, without a warrant, other parts of the house that
were not affected by the fire and discovered more evidence of arson. 25 The
Court held the following:
[I]f the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of
criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained
only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant
evidence will be found in the place to be searched. If
evidence of criminal activity is discovered during the course
of a valid administrative search, it may be seized under the
"plain view" doctrine.... Fire officials may not, however,
rely on this evidence to expand the scope of their
administrative search without first making a successful
showing of probable cause to an independent judicial
26
officer.

Clifford is in apparent tension with New York v. Burger. 27 In Burger
Justice Brennan urged, in his dissent, that "[i]n the law of administrative
searches, one principle emerges with unusual clarity and unanimous

118. Id. at 366. The plaintiff was arrested, but not for housing code violations resulting
from the administrative search. Id. at 362. Rather, the plaintiff was arrested for resisting the
inspection of his house without a warrant. Id.
119. Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
120.464 U.S. 287 (1984).
121. Id. at 294.
122. Id. at 289.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 290.
125. Id. at 290-91.
126. Id. at 294 (citation omitted).
127.482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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to search for criminal violations."'2 The majority of the Court in Burger,
129
however, upheld a conviction made pursuant to an administrative search.
Even so, the majority recognized in principle that administrative searches
cannot be used as a pretext for criminal searches. 3 ° The conflicting views in
Burger,as well as the apparent tension between Burger and Clifford,illustrate
the struggle of the Court to decide whether a criminal prosecution resulting
from a warrantless administrative search is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Likewise, this principle is unclear in the area of special needs
searches.
As previously mentioned, the Court has sometimes upheld criminal
However, as
prosecutions that resulted from special needs searches.'
from those
be
distinguished
discussed further below, the Ferguson case can
cases in which the Court has upheld a prosecution, because in those cases the
prosecuted individuals were on notice that the special needs search could lead
to a prosecution.'32 Furthermore, the special needs doctrine should not have
justified the seizure and subsequent use of the positive drug test results in a
criminal prosecution when a physician was allowed to reveal to law
enforcement, without a warrant, information that a patient would have likely
believed was confidential.
B. ComparisonBetween Ferguson and Special Needs Cases in Which a
Criminal Conviction was Upheld: The Notice Difference
In Griffin and Sitz, the Court upheld criminal convictions that were the
result of special needs searches.' 33 The petitioner in Griffin had been convicted
of a state law weapons offense after a probation officer searched his home
without a warrant and found a gun.M The Court found the search to be
reasonable under the special needs exception because the supervision of
probationers is an important governmental interest. 3 sThe Court dispensed with
the warrant requirement in this case because probation officers would be at a
disadvantage in responding quickly to misconduct if they had to obtain a
warrant first.'36 The conviction was thus upheld.'37

128. Id. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. In Burgerthe owner of an automobilejunkyard was convicted of possession of stolen
property after an inspection of his junkyard. Id. at 695-96.
130. Id. at 712-16.
13 1.See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
132. See Part III.B.
133. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880.
134. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870.
135. Id. at 875-76.
136. Id. at 876.
137. Id. at 880.
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Sitz centered on whether highway sobriety checkpoints violated the Fourth
Amendment. 3 Under the checkpoint scheme, checkpoints were set up at
various locations on state roads.'39 All drivers were stopped briefly to check for
intoxication."4 If a motorist showed signs of intoxication, the motorist would
be directed out ofthe traffic flow where more sobriety tests would take place.' 4 '
If all the tests suggested that the motorist was intoxicated, then the motorist
would be arrested. 42 The Court upheld the program, noting that the checkpoint
program advanced the special need of preventing drunken driving.'43
However, these cases are distinguishable from Ferguson in that, even
though the special needs searches in Griffin and Sitz led to arrests and
prosecutions, the individuals arrested and prosecuted were on notice that they
could be subject to arrest. In Sitz the checkpoint tests were conducted by police
officers.'" Any citizen at a checkpoint site would realize that the search was
beingused as amethod ofarresting intoxicated individuals. Likewise in Griffin,
although police officers were not actually conducting the search, the
probationer in the case was still on notice that his misconduct could lead to an
arrest if the probation officer discovered the misconduct while supervising the
probationer. 4 Although a probation officer is not a police officer, a probation
officer is sufficiently connected with law enforcement to place a probationer
on notice that a probation officer may be able to use evidence of the
probationer's misconduct against the probationer in a criminal prosecution.'46
However, the notice available in both of these cases is not present in the
Ferguson case.
In Ferguson the maternity patients were not aware that their urine drug
tests were going to be reported to law enforcement if their urine tested positive
for cocaine.47 The consent forms giving the hospital staff the right to test the
patients did not disclose to the patients that their results would be reported to
the police." Unlike the situations in Griffin and Sitz, in Ferguson the staff at
138. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.

143. Id. at 455.
144.Id. at 447.
145. Griffin v. Wisconson, 483 U.S. 868, 871 (1987). Three plainclothes policemen
accompanied the probation officers, but did not participate in the search. Id.
146. The reasonableness of inferring notice in Griffin was buttressed by the fact that
Wisconsin regulations at the time permitted a probation officer to search a probationer's home
without a warrant as long as "reasonable grounds" to believe contraband would be found were
present. See id.at 870-71. Probationers also violated the terms of their probation if they refused
to consent to a probation officer's search of their home. Id. at 871.
147. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 486 (4th Cir. 1999) (Blake, J.,
dissenting).
148. Id. One issue in Ferguson was whether the maternity patients had consented to the
disclosure of their test results to law enforcement. Id. at 488-89. The district court found that the
consent forms signed by the maternity patients, which did not inform the patients that their test
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MUSC conducted the urine drug test searches. 49 A physician or other
healthcare worker is not sufficiently connected to law enforcement to provide
a patient with notice that positive results of a drug test could be used in a
criminal prosecution against the patient.
Notice is an important factor under the special needs doctrine because
notice of a possible criminal prosecution reduces the subjective level of
intrusion, or the "surprise factor."' 50 Inroadblock cases, the Supreme Courthas
focused on the notice available in fixed roadblock cases versus the lack of
notice in roving roadblock cases.'5 ' Fixed roadblocks decrease the level of
surprise felt by motorists because "they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the
location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere."' s2 A roving
roadblock, or even a random stop, 53 frightens motorists because a roving stop
does not provide the same notice as a fixed roadblock, in that with a fixed
54
roadblock, the motorist can see that other automobiles are also being stopped.'
The concept of notice operates similarly in cases such as Ferguson. If a
maternity patient is put on sufficient notice that the positive test results may be
disclosed to law enforcement and possibly used in a criminal prosecution, then
the element of surprise is eliminated. If notice were available to the maternity
patients, then under this Note's alternative analysis of the special needs
doctrine, law enforcement's warrantless receipt of the test results would not
violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the test results were used in

results were to be reported to law enforcement, did not establish consent. Id. at 488. However
the jury still found that consent was present. Id. Judge Blake in his dissent disagreed with the
jury verdict. Id. He did not find the evidence sufficient to uphold the verdict. Id. At trial the
defendants presented letters that accompanied the consent forms and a public service
announcement made by the solicitor's office in 1990, which indicated that pregnant cocaine
users could be subject to prosecution, as evidence that the patients consented. Id. at 488-89.
Judge Blake did not find this evidence sufficient to show that the patients consented to the use
of their drug tests in possible criminal prosecutions against them. Id. For purposes of this Note,
the assumption is that consent was not given since the consent forms did not advise the patients
that their drug tests could be disclosed to law enforcement. If the patients had validly consented,
then they would have been put on notice that the special needs search could result in a criminal
prosecution.
149. Id. at 474.
150. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,452-53 (1990); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976).
151. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at452-53; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,657 (1979); MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59.
152. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559 (upholding suspicionless stops at permanent
checkpoints for the purpose of detaining illegal aliens).
153. In Prouse the issue was whether a patrolman could stop an automobile to check the
motorist's license and registration when neitherprobable cause norreasonable suspicion existed
to believe that the motorist or the other occupants were violating applicable laws. Prouse, 440
U.S. at 650. The Court held that this was an impermissible seizure, in part due to the
"unconstrained discretion" given to officers in deciding which automobiles to stop. Id. at 661,
663.
154. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 558.
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criminal prosecutions.15 Therefore, even though the primary contention ofthis
Note is that special needs searches should never lead to criminal prosecutions,
if courts are going to allow a special needs search to result in a criminal
prosecution, the individual should have notice that the search results could be
used to criminally convict her." 6 Therefore, the special needs searches
conducted by MUSC hospital staff should not have led to the conviction of
maternity patients at MUSC.
C. Physician-PatientRelationship: Legitimacy ofPrivacyExpectations
ThatIncreasethe Level ofIntrusion Underthe SpecialNeeds Doctrine
One component of the Ferguson case that raises concerns regarding the
arrests of maternity patients at MUSC is that the patients' physicians and other
healthcare workers at MUSC turned over the results of the urine tests to law
enforcement. These were tests that the patients and private physicians would
consider confidential. Because the Fourth Circuit analyzed these tests as
special needs, the court should have evaluated the physician-patient
relationship when analyzing the intrusiveness factor." 7 The intrusion on
privacy is increased when doctors violate their trust with their patients by
reporting medical-tests results to law enforcement. While doctors certainly
have the right to test the urine of their patients under the special needs doctrine,
doctors should not collaborate with law enforcement to share confidential
information about their patients in such a way that law enforcement is able to

155. The principal argument of this Note contends that the special needs doctrine should
not be used to permit a warrantless search when a criminal prosecution followed the search.
Under this standard, notice to the maternity patients would not be sufficient tojustify disclosing
the positive tests results to law enforcement officials. See infra Part Ill, Section A.
156. Cases exist in the school context in which a special needs search led to a conviction
or when courts have indicated that these searches could lead to a conviction. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 329, 347-48 (1985) (upholding a juvenile delinquency adjudication of a
student based on a warrantless search in which her school principal found marihuana in her
purse); Todd v. Rush County Schs., 983 F. Supp. 799,802 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (indicating that urine
drug test results on students participating in extracurricular activities could be subpoenaed in
criminal orjuvenile proceedings). Even though an adjudication ofdelinquency injuvenile court
is not technically a conviction, the two are substantially equivalent. See In reWinship, 397 U.S.
358, 365-66 (1970). These types of school cases could also be distinguished on the basis of
notice. Even though school officials are not as connected with law enforcement as probation
officers, school officials often stand in disciplinary positions, which might serve notice to
students that their conduct at school is subject to special needs searches which could lead to
criminal prosecutions. See TL.O. 469 U.S. at 339-40. These distinctions may seem strained,
which is one reason supporting a more categorical rule that disallows the use of special needs
searches in criminal arrests and convictions. Maintaining probable cause and warrant
requirements for criminal cases would better ensure that Fourth Amendment protections still
exist in today's society.
157. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469,479 (4th Cir. 1999). The court only
analyzed the intrusiveness of the method by which the urine samples were collected. Id.
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evade the warrant requirement in obtaining evidence that is later used in a
prosecution.
The relationship between the physician and the patient creates an
expectation by the patient that the doctor will not reveal information to third
parties not authorized to receive such information."5 8 The significance of the
relationship between the physician and patient increases the level of intrusion
suffered from both objective and subjective viewpoints when law enforcement
forms a partnership with the physicians." 9 From an objective standpoint,
society legitimately expects privacy in medical records, and thus presumably
expects physicians to respect the duty of confidentiality.' 60Because the Fourth
Circuit in Ferguson only evaluated the intrusiveness of the urine tests
themselves in terms of duration and intensity,' the court failed to account for
the objective nature of the privacy interest in the physician-patient relationship.
The Supreme Court in Vernonia analyzed the nature and expectations of
privacy involved in the teacher-student relationship, and the Fourth Circuit
should have done the same with the physician-patient relationship. 62
From a subjective viewpoint, MUSC maternity patients suffered an
increased intrusion on privacy when the physicians reported the positive drug
test results to law enforcement officials. While the Fourth Circuit also failed to
analyze the level of intrusion which occurred through the dissemination of the
test results, the court stated: "[T]he subjective level of intrusion is measured
by the extent to which the method chosen minimizes or enhances fear and
surprise on the part of those searched or detained."' 63 The patients were
surprised that the positive test results were reported to police because the
patients were never informed that the urine testing method would be used in
such a way."
When objectively analyzing an individual's legitimate expectations in
privacy, the Supreme Court has focused on the importance of relationships

158. See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 367-69.
159. In Vernonia the Court stated: "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not protect all
subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as 'legitimate'.. . .In
addition, the legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-A-vis the State may depend upon the
individual's legal relationship with the State." Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
654 (1995) (citation omitted).
160. Peter H.W. van der Goes, Jr., Comment, OpportunityLost: Why andHow to Improve
theHHS-ProposedLegislationGoverningLawEnforcement.Access to MedicalRecords, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1999) (stating that many studies confirm that Americans consider the
privacy of medical records extremely important).
161. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
162. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57 (finding that students have a lesser expectation of
privacy due to the nature of the teacher-student relationship).
163. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479 (citation omitted).
164. See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 369. "The women [arrested under MUSC's policy]
did not know that their medical providers would disclose information about their drug addiction
to the police." Id. The women were "stunned by the discovery that their health care providers
were working in conjunction with the police." Id.
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between parties in several special needs cases. 65 In O'Connorv. Ortega 66
public hospital officials searched an employee's office, desk, and file cabinets
when the employee was suspected of violations in managing a hospital
residency program.' 67 In analyzing the employee's privacy expectations, the
Court noted that the "operational realities of the workplace... may make some
employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a
supervisor rather than a law enforcement official . . . . The employee's
expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment
relation."' 6 The Court also compared the employer's use of the gathered
information found in the search to law enforcement's use of such information:
"[W]hile police, and even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct
searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal or
other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to enter the
offices and desks oftheir employees for legitimate work-related reasons wholly
unrelated to illegal conduct."' 69
In Griffin v. Wisconsin170 the Court, in upholding the warrantless search of
a probationer's home by a probation officer, remarked that the supervision
aspect of the relationship between the probationer and the probation officer
permitted a greater degree of intrusion into privacy than if this same search had
been conducted on the public at large.17 ' The reasoning in O'Connor and
Griffin suggests that a greater degree of intrusion is allowed by physicians than
law enforcement because ofthe nature of the physician-patient relationship and
because physicians perform medical tests for health-related purposes, not for
law enforcement objectives.
The Court in Vernonia, while upholding random drug tests for school
athletes, warned:
[W]hen the government conducts a search in its capacity as
employer.., the relevant question is whether that intrusion
upon privacy is one that a reasonable employer might engage
in; so also when the government acts as guardian and tutor
the relevant question is whether the search is one that a
72
reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake.

165. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (discussing the teacher-student relationship); Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (discussing the supervision aspects of the probation
officer-probationer relationship); O'Connorv. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,712-13 (1987) (discussing
an employer-employee relationship).
166.480 U.S. 709 (1987).
167. Id. at 712-13.
168. Id. at 717.
169. Id. at 721.
170.483 U.S. 868 (1987).
171. Id. at 875.
172. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (citation omitted).
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Therefore, in Fergusonthe relevant question is whether a reasonable physician
would pass on information that a patient considered confidential to law
enforcement. Because most patients would not expect this type of conduct by
physicians and because physicians might consider this a breach of their
confidential duty to patients, reasonable physicians would likely not engage in
this conduct.
Asking the question of whether areasonable physician would report patient
information to law enforcement focuses on the concept of physician-patient
confidentiality and the privacy expectations in medical records, such as urine
tests. Every physician inthe United States today must take the Hippocratic oath
that declares:
I will keep this Oath and this Covenant to the best of my
ability andjudgement ....
Whatever I see or hear concerning
the lives of men during the practice of my profession, or even
outside of it, I will not divulge, guarding these things as
religious secrets. 73
Further, "[t]he physician's duty to protect the confidences of his or her patients
is an ancient and time-honored tradition, essential to the well-being of the
patient and the integrity of the profession."'7 However, this duty of
confidentiality is in jeopardy due to the failure of courts to recognize the
protection of confidential patient information.'75 This duty of physician-patient
confidentiality has also weakened because of the law enforcement exception,
in which physicians may be statutorily required to report confidential
information to law enforcement.'76 Physicians are often given a wide range of
discretion in revealing confidential information to law enforcement.'
Despite the decline in the physician-patient duty of confidentiality, support
exists for upholding this duty. In Alexander v. Knight.. the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania addressed the actions of a physician who was employed by
defense attorneys to interview physicians of injured plaintiffs and to secure
reports from these physicians about the plaintiffs.' 79 The court opined:
[M]embers ofaprofession, especially the medical profession,
stand in a confidential or fiduciary capacity as to their
patients. They owe their patients more than just medical care
for which payment is exacted; there is a duty of total care;
173. Stephen Aaron Silver, Note, Beyond Jaffee v. Redmond: Should the FederalCourts
Recognize a Right to Physician-PatientConfidentiality?,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1809, 1810 (1998).
174. Id. at 1809.
175. Id. at 1811.
176. See van der Goes, Jr., supra note 160, at 1046-47.
177. Id. at 1063.
178. 177 A.2d 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962).
179. Id. at 146.
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that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in
litigation, to render reports when necessary and to attend
court when needed. That further includes a duty to refuse
affirmative180 assistance to the patient's antagonist in
litigation.
One federal district court expressed similar concerns in Hammonds v.
Aetna Casualty& Surety Co.' In that case the defendant insurance company
induced the plaintiff's physician to reveal confidential patient information. 8 '
The court asserted that, in litigation matters concerning a patient's illness, a
patient's physician should testify on behalf of his patient as required by the
physician's total duty of care.' The court agreed with other courts that a
physician should not ordinarily disclose a patient's confidential information
without the patient's consent, unless disclosure is needed to advance a public
interest or a private interest of the patient.' The court relied on the fact that the
information a patient gives a physician is often very intimate.'85 The
information may be "embarrassing, disgraceful or incriminating."' 86 Therefore,
whenever a physician discloses a patient's confidential information to third
parties, the patient suffers an intrusion of privacy.'87 The court stated that the
duty of physician-patient confidentiality should not only be an ethical duty on
the part of the physician, but also a legal duty. 88
In South Carolina, courts have also implied a physician duty of
•confidentiality. Although South Carolina does not recognize aphysician-patient
evidentiary privilege, South Carolina does recognize a qualified duty of
confidentiality by a physician to the patient. In South CarolinaState Boardof
Medical Examiners v. Hedgepath,89 the Board of Medical Examiners
disciplined a physician for revealing confidential information through a
voluntary affidavit at a divorce proceeding of one of his patients. 90 The
physician revealed patient information that he received while acting as a family
therapist for the patient and the patient's spouse.'' The Board disciplined the

physician under an ethical code provision which states the following:

180. Id.
181. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
182. Id. at 795.
183. Id. at 799.
184. Id. at 800.
185. Id. at 801.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 801-02.

189. 325 S.C. 166, 480 S.E.2d 724 (1997).
190. Id. at 168, 480 S.E.2d at 725.
191. Id.
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A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him
in the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he
may observe in the character ofpatients, unless he is required
to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to
protect the welfare of the individual or of the community. 92
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision. 93
InMcCormickv.England9 4 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a physician's breach of the duty of confidentiality, in the absence of a
compelling public interest or other justification for disclosure, is an actionable
tort.'95 In that case the plaintiff brought an action against her physician for
revealing confidential information about her emotional health during a divorce
proceeding.'96 The court of appeals looked at what they saw as a modem trend
ofrecognizing the importance ofprotecting the physician-patient relationship,
and the court noted that public policy favors maintaining the duty of
confidentiality. 97
Thus, South Carolina has recognized that physicians have a limited duty
of confidentiality, a duty that "must give way when disclosure is compelled by
law or is in the best interest of the patient or others."' 98 The MUSC policy
requiring disclosure of patients' positive test results to law enforcement
officials is inconsistent with the physician's duty of confidentiality. At first
glance, the public interest exception to the duty of confidentiality appears to
permit the MUSC policy to override the duty of confidentiality because the
state can present evidence of a need to protect the health of pregnant drug
users' fetuses.' However, public policy can arguably support the conclusion

192. Id. (quoting 26 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 81-60(I) (1976)); see also 26 S.C. CODE ANN.
REGs. 81-60(D) (West Supp. 1999) (amended regulation).
193. Hedgepath,325 S.C. at 169,480 S.E.2d at 726. The court distinguished the concepts
of a physician-patient privilege, which South Carolina does not recognize, and the duty of
confidentiality.Id. The court stated that a physician's duty ofconfidentiality is independent from
whether he can be "legally compelled to reveal some or all ofthose confidences, that is, whether
those communications are privileged." Id. Therefore, a physician should maintain a patients'
confidences within the limitations of the law, even though the physician may later be forced to
reveal confidences because no physician-patient privilege exists. Id.
194.328 S.C. 627,494 S.E.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id. at 640, 494 S.E.2d at 437.
196. Id. at 630-31, 494 S.E.2d at 432-33.
197.Id. at 636, 639,494 S.E.2d at 435, 437. The court also relied on the Physicians' Patient
Records Act, see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-115-10 to -150 (West Supp. 1999), for its holding. Id.
at 639, 494 S.E.2d at 437.
198. McCormick, 328 S.C. at 644, 494 S.E.2d at 439.
199. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469,477-78 (4th Cir. 1999). Disclosure
of confidential patient information in the Ferguson case is not required by any statute enacted
by the South Carolina General Assembly, but is rather a policy developed by state hospital
personnel and law enforcement officials. Id. at 474. Therefore, for the disclosure of confidential
patient information to be permissible, it should comply with the public interest exception to the
duty of confidentiality.
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that physicians should not report this information to law enforcement."'
Specifically, it may be in the best interest of the fetus exposed to maternal
cocaine use for this information to go unreported. Pregnant women that are
using cocaine may withhold pertinent information relating to the health of their
unborn children fromtheirphysicians ifthey fear theirphysicians will turn over
the information to law enforcement."' Furthermore, some pregnant women
using cocaine may avoid prenatal care altogether in order to avoid
prosecution,'0 2 thus preventing the start of health care that could possibly treat
prenatal exposure to cocaine. 3 Thus, even when looking at the public's
interest in protecting the health of cocaine-exposed fetuses, the correct
conclusion appears to be to uphold the physician-patient confidential
relationship by not allowing physicians to voluntarily reveal a patient's
confidential information.'"

Another factor to consider when answering the question of whether a
reasonable physician should report a patient's urine drug test results to law
enforcement is whether urine tests are confidential information at all. No clear
doctrine exists regarding whether medical records are confidential information
that a physician should never reveal, unless required by law or by a strong
public interest.205 Because there is no clear doctrine on whether medical records

200. See Mills, supranote 6, at 1037; Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 367-68.
201. See Mills, supra note 6, at 1037 (stating that mandatory reporting requirements make
a woman's physician an informant against her, thus creating an "environment of mistrust in the
physician-patient relationship which makes the patient withhold information," which then
decreases the effective level of healthcare for the mother and the fetus); Paul-Emile, supra note
4, at 367-68.
202. See Gosain, supranote 61, at 817.
203. See Roberts, supranote 98, at 953 (stating that medical studies have shown that the
"harmful effects of prenatal crack exposure may be temporary and treatable").
204. Child abuse statutes in many states, including South Carolina, usually require a
physician to report evidence of child abuse to law enforcement. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510
(West Supp. 1999). In South Carolina, because the Court in Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1,4,492
S.E.2d 777, 778 (1997), held that the term "child" in S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op.
1976), included a viable fetus, a physician has a duty to report cocaine use by a maternity patient
when the fetus is viable. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring
physicians to report information which led them to believe a child had been abused). However,
some scholars and other courts argue that this reading of child abuse statutes is unconstitutional.
See Mills, supra note 6, at 1020. They contend that pregnant women would not have been aware
that their conduct could fall under these statutes because the statutes only mentioned child abuse
and not fetal abuse. Id. Lack ofnotice ofpossible criminal prosecution raises constitutional due
process concerns. See id. Because these child abuse reporting statutes seem questionable, they
should not be used conclusively as a means to justify overriding the physician-patient
confidentiality present between the physicians and patients at MUSC. Furthermore, the statutes
should not be used as a justification for the MUSC policy because the MUSC policy actually
requires a physician to do more than the child abuse statutes do. The child abuse statutes only
require a physician to report evidence of abuse that they find during the course of a regular
medical examination, while the MUSC policy imposes affirmative duties upon physicians by
requiring physicians to conduct drug tests on maternity patients. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510
(West Supp. 1999).
205. See van der Goes, Jr., supra note 160, at 1036.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/11

24

Vaughn: Circumventing the Fourth Amendment Via the Special Needs Doctrine

2000

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

are confidential, the problem arises, as in the Ferguson case, when law
enforcement is able to obtain a patient's positive urine drug test results without
following any Fourth Amendment procedures.
In Whalen v. Roe 2' the Court, while not holding that medical records are
confidential, did address the idea that medical records are protected somewhat
by privacy interests." 7 In this case New York recorded in a computer file the
names and addresses of all persons who obtained, through a physician's
prescription, certain drugs for which both a legal and an illegal market
existed.2" 8 While the Court upheld the state's actions, the Court recognized that
there were privacy concerns involved that had to be balanced against the state's
interest. 20 9 Conceivably, Whalen opened the door for a future court to find that
a privacy right in highly sensitive medical records, such as the urine tests in
Ferguson,could outweigh the governmental interest in their disclosure to law
enforcement.210 In his concurrence Justice Brennan warned: "Broad
dissemination by state officials of such information, however, would clearly
implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be
justified only by compelling state interests."2 . Furthermore, in Whalen a harder
constitutional question for protecting the privacy of medical records was
presented than in Ferguson because the right of privacy claimed in that case
was not tied to any specific provision in the Constitution, but rather to a general
"zone of privacy" claim. 2 In Ferguson the Fourth Amendment served as the
basis for an unreasonable intrusion on privacy.2 13
Fergusonpresents a case of a certain type of medical record in a certain
circumstance which should perhaps be protected as private, confidential
information. In Vernonia the Court was concerned with the nature of urine
tests, in that urine tests also can disclose other private information which is not
the subject of the search, such as signs that an individual is epileptic, pregnant,
or diabetic.2" 4 While the Court in Vernonia did not find that the urine tests were

206.429 U.S. 589 (1977).
207. Id. at 605-06; see van der Goes, Jr., supra note 160, at 1033.
208. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
209. Id. at 599-604. Using a type of balancing test, the Court stated that the New York
program of"[r]equiring such disclosures to representatives ofthe State having responsibility for
the health of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of
privacy." Id. at 602.
210. van der Goes, Jr., supranote 160, at 1033.
211. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212. See id. at 598-99.
213. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469,476 (4th Cir. 1999).
214. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); see also Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) ("It is not disputed, however, that
chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an
employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic."). In Vernonia,
however, the Court concluded that the drug tests were not used for disclosing whether a student
was epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic, thus reducing the intrusiveness aspect of the tests. See
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
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sufficiently private to prohibit random drug testing for student athletes in light
of other factors in the case, such as the reduced expectation of privacy for
students,215 in Ferguson a stronger case is present for protecting the privacy of
urine tests because the tests are conducted by physicians and healthcare
workers, which creates a higher expectation of privacy. 2 6
Cases in lower courts since Whalen have decided both for and against a
reasonable expectation ofprivacy in medical records, and while there has been
no consensus on whether certain types of medical records should be private,
support clearly exists for privacy in certain medical records in particular
circumstances.2t7 Furthermore in Yin v. California,2 8 the Ninth Circuit stated
that "[m]edical examinations and medical tests that are not conducted as part
of a criminal investigation are generally subject to the balancing test, not the
'
warrant/probable cause requirement."219
This comment implies that in
Ferguson, because the urine tests were used in a criminal prosecution, law
enforcement should have complied with the warrant requirements ofthe Fourth
Amendment.
Even though courts are undecided on whether medical records are
confidential information, there still remains sufficient support for the
proposition that medical records should be confidential. Moreover, society has
a reasonable and legitimate expectation in the confidentiality of medical

215. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 659-60.
216. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
217. See, e.g., Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1138, 1140 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding that the public interest in maintaining employee health programs free of fraud
outweighed the privacy interests of an employee's prescription records); People v. Perlos, 462
N.W.2d 310, 316 (Mich. 1990) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in blood alcohol
test results that are obtained by the police from the hospital after the defendants involved in
automobile accidents were suspected of driving while intoxicated); State v. Copeland, 680
S.W.2d 327,330 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding a reasonable expectation that hospital would keep
blood tests private and not turn results over to police without patient's consent); State v. Dyal,
478 A.2d 390, 391, 394 (N.J. 1984) (determining from legislative intent that blood tests were
subject to the physician-patient privilege; thus, in a death-by-auto case, police had to apply for
a subpoena duces tecum to obtain the results); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135,137,139
(Pa. 1994) (finding that, even though there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in medical
records, a police officer had probable cause to request from the hospital, without a warrant, the
blood results of a suspected drunken driver involved in an accident); Commonwealth v. Hipp,
551 A.2d 1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (stating that, while an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in blood tests, if a police officer has probable cause to obtain the blood
test results, the hospital has an affirmative duty to turn over the results to the police); State v.
Jenkins, 259 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Wis. 1977) (finding no reasonable expectation privacy in blood
tests); see also van der Goes, Jr., supranote 160, at 1037-38 (discussing the lack of uniformity
in how courts access expectations of privacy in medical records).
218. 95 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 1996).
219. Id. at 869, 873 (holding that the state could request an employee, who had been
excessively absent from work, to submit to an independent medical examination because the
governmental interests outweighed the employee's privacy interests).
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records. 0 Therefore, when analyzing the question of what reasonable
physicians do and should do, society's expectations should be taken into
account. Patients are expecting that their physicians will maintain the duty of
confidentiality, and patients expect that all medical records willbe confidential,
including urine tests. The physicians and other healthcare workers in Ferguson
should have preserved the confidential relationship that patients expect by not
collaborating with law enforcement and voluntarily reporting positive drug test
results.
IV. CONCLUSION

Ferguson illustrates an attempt to find a quick solution to a problem by
circumventing constitutional protections. The government, and society as a
whole, has a strong interest in preventing maternal cocaine use. MUSC's
policy of testing the urine of suspected pregnant cocaine users would have
provided a constitutional means toward alleviating the problem by detecting
maternal cocaine users and placing the users in treatment, but only if the
positive drug test results had not been reported to law enforcement. That further
step exceeded the boundaries of the special needs doctrine, and hence the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit's erosion of the special needs doctrine
has lessened the Fourth Amendment's protections by allowing law enforcement
to ignore its requirements in criminal cases. Furthermore, patients in the
Ferguson case were let down, not just by the criminal justice system, but by
their own physicians and nurses. Sacrificing the Fourth Amendment protections
and the value of trusted relationships will not eliminate fetal cocaine abuse, but
will only lead to more distrust and suspicion in the government. Treatable
social ills, such as fetal cocaine abuse, will never diminish if those individuals
afflicted are not able to seek help from the government without fear of
punishment.
Carmen Vaughn

220. See van der Goes, Jr., supra note 160, at 1011. "[I]t seems reasonable to assume that
individuals might expect that a higher level ofprivacy will be afforded to their medical history."
Id. at 1040.
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